Warning: The magic method OCDI\OneClickDemoImport::__wakeup() must have public visibility in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php on line 121 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-content/themes/book-club/importer/inc/OneClickDemoImport.php:121) in /customers/a/8/2/robertmellis.net/httpd.www/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1831 {"id":553,"date":"2019-01-28T16:13:54","date_gmt":"2019-01-28T16:13:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/?page_id=553"},"modified":"2019-01-28T16:13:55","modified_gmt":"2019-01-28T16:13:55","slug":"glossary-of-biases-fallacies-and-metaphysical-beliefs","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/glossary-of-biases-fallacies-and-metaphysical-beliefs\/","title":{"rendered":"Glossary of Biases, Fallacies and Metaphysical Beliefs"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This glossary includes terms for cognitive biases, fallacies and metaphysical beliefs that are used in this book, but that are not terms specific to Middle Way Philosophy because they are also more widely used in psychology and philosophy. My definitions of them may nevertheless offer an unconventional emphasis for practical purposes. A few terms here overlap with those in the glossary of Middle Way Philosophy terms.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the sake of clarity and to show the relationship between all the cognitive biases, fallacies and metaphysical beliefs in this list, I have given the briefest possible definitions, all in the form \u2018assumption that…\u2019. All definitions also make explicit the absolutisation of judgement involved (by using terms such as \u2018must\u2019, \u2018necessarily\u2019, or \u2018absolutely\u2019) and the possibility of an equally flawed opposite wherever relevant. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Absolute idealism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat all phenomena are ultimately purely\nmental, this state being progressively disclosed by a dialectical process\n(opposite: dialectical materialism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Absolutism (Moral)<\/strong>\nAssumption that a particular ethical formulation must be universally normative\n(opposite: relativism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Action bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat it is necessarily better (or necessarily worse) to act rather than remain\ninactive<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Actor\/ observer bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat we are not responsible for effects that correlate with our own negative\nactions (opposite: illusion of control)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ad hoc argument <\/strong>Assumption\nof new unrecognised criteria for judgement during the course of an argument<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ad hominem <\/strong>Assumption\nthat claims about a person making an argument must (or must not) be relevant to\nthat argument<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ambiguity aversion <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim in which specific terms are ambiguous is unambiguous<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amphiboly aversion <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim which is grammatically ambiguous as a whole is unambiguous<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anchoring <\/strong>Assumption\nthat our subjection to \u2018anchors\u2019 (unconscious starting points for the formation\nof belief) is either fully controllable or inevitable <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Antinomianism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat no rule can ever be justified (opposite: legalism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to authority <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a particular source of authority (person, text etc) absolutely justifies\n(or absolutely refutes) a claim<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to\nconsequences <\/strong>Assumption that a particular representation of the\nconsequences of believing a claim necessarily make it acceptable or\nunacceptable<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to envy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified (or absolutely not) if it fulfils feelings\nof envy<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to fear <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified (or absolutely not) if its acceptance\navoids a feared outcome<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to hatred <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified (or absolutely not) if it fulfils feelings\nof hatred<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to history <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified (or absolutely not) by an example from the\npast<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to hope <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified (or absolutely not) if its acceptance\nbrings about a desired outcome<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to humility <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified if it avoids fulfilling feelings of pride<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to ignorance <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim must be true because it has not been shown to be untrue<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to pity <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim must be true (or must be untrue) because it fulfils feelings of\npity<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to popularity <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim must be true or false because large numbers of others agree with\nit<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to present <\/strong>Assumption\nthat present information completely negates past information (or that it does\nnot negate it at all)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to pride <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim must be true because it fulfils feelings of pride<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appeal to tradition <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is absolutely justified (or absolutely not) by continuing group\nbeliefs of the past<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Association bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an association gives us absolute information about what we encounter<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Association fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat because two things share a particular association, they must also be\nsimilar (or dissimilar) in other respects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Atheism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat God or gods absolutely do not exist (opposite: theism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attentional bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the current objects of our attention are the only ones that could be\nconsidered (or that they could not be considered)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attribute\nsubstitution <\/strong>Assumption that more difficult problems can be resolved by\nsubstituting easier ones in their place (or that absolutely no substitution is\npossible)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Authority bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a particular source of authority provides absolute truth or falsity<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Autonomy of facts <\/strong>Assumption\nof the autonomy of facts from values, regardless of their practical\ninterdependence<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Availability bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat more meaningful events are necessarily more probable (or necessarily more\nimprobable)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Base rate neglect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a narrower and more mentally available categorisation must be more\nrelevant to probability than a wider and less available one<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Because\u2019\njustification <\/strong>Assumption that the mere form of a justification provides\nactual justification<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Behaviourism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat representations about minds can be completely reduced to those about\nbehaviour (Opposite: cannot be thus reduced \u2013 a form of essentialism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belief bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an argument is justified (or refuted) according to the acceptability (or\nunacceptability) of the conclusion rather than according to the reasons given<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belief\ndisconfirmation paradigm <\/strong>Assumption that an alternative explanation must be\ntrue instead of the disconfirmation of a belief<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Black Swan <\/strong>Assumption\nthat unusual events that disconfirm a belief are impossible because they have\nnot been experienced within the limited sphere considered<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Casuistry <\/strong>Assumption\nthat decontextualised information about a specific case provides an absolute\nreason for the application or non-application of a general rule<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Causal direction\nfallacy <\/strong>Assumption that the direction of causation between two events must\nnecessarily go one way when it may go other ways<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cause\/ correlation\nfallacy <\/strong>Assumption that a correlation between two events must necessarily\nindicate a causal relationship (or the absence of one) between them<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cherry picking <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a selection of some specific pieces of evidence from a wider context must\nnecessarily (or necessarily not) support wider claims about that context<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Circular argument <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim is proved or disproved by a reason given, even when that reason is\nitself dependent (or counter-dependent) on the claim being proved<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clustering illusion <\/strong>Assumption\nthat patterns detected in information necessarily indicate (or necessarily do\nnot indicate) general truths about it<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coherentism (sole\nreliance on) <\/strong>Assumption that a set of beliefs must be true or false because\nof the coherent relation they have with each other<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compatibilism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat choice can be absolutely reduced to a form compatible with determinism\n(Opposite: that it cannot \u2013 incompatibilism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Confirmation bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat observations that appear to confirm (or disconfirm) a belief do so\nabsolutely<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conjunction fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a (mentally available) conjunction of two conditions is more probable than\none of those conditions by itself<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cosmic justice<\/strong>\nAssumption that the effects of actions must (or must not) reflect justice in\nthe universe by providing moral requital<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Decision fatigue <\/strong>Assumption\nthat our judgement remains unaffected (or is absolutely affected) by fatigue\nfrom previous decision-making<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deformation\nProfessionelle <\/strong>Assumption that actions that apply our skills and resources\nmust (or must not) be the right ones<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Determinism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat all events must be sufficiently caused and theoretically predictable\n(opposite: indeterminism in general, freewill as regards choice)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dialectical\nmaterialism <\/strong>Assumption that all phenomena are purely physical, this state\nbeing progressively disclosed by a dialectical process (opposite: absolute\nidealism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Distribution neglect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a mean figure reflects (or does not reflect) a truth about things\nrepresented by that figure, regardless of the distribution of the data drawn on\nto create the mean<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Domain dependence <\/strong>Assumption\nthat general beliefs cannot (or absolutely can) be applied outside a specific\nhabitual domain<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dualism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an understanding of experience in terms of opposed pairs of metaphysical\nclaims is desirable or unavoidable (assumed by all metaphysical beliefs and\nthus not subject to a metaphysical opposite \u2013 note that monism<\/em> is not an opposite but a type of dualism in this sense)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Effort justification <\/strong>Assumption\nthat something should necessarily (or necessarily not) be valued more because\nwe have exerted effort in achieving it<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Empiricism\n(metaphysical form) <\/strong>Assumption that claims supported by sense experience\nmust be true, with a priori <\/em>claims\nbeing uninformative (not all empiricists follow this version; opposite:\nrationalism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Endowment effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an object necessarily gains (or does not gain) value from association with\nor possession by us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Envy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat our own position is absolutely negative in comparison to another\u2019s which\nis positive<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equivocation <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an absolute conclusion can be drawn from reasoning that includes different\nsenses of the same word (or that not even a provisional conclusion can be drawn\nbecause of the omnipresence of some degree of equivocation)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Essential androgyny <\/strong>Assumption\nof some radical feminists that humans are innately free of gendered traits\napart from those directly involving reproduction (opposite: essential gender)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Essential gender <\/strong>Assumption\nthat humans have innate gender traits beyond those directly involving\nreproduction (opposite: essential androgyny)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Essentialism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the qualities at higher or more complex levels of description must be\nentirely representationally distinct from those at lower levels, thus\nirreducible to them (opposite: reductionism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Etymological fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the linguistic derivation of a word in the past absolutely dictates (or\nmakes absolutely no contribution to) its meaning in the present<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Expressivism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat meaning must be solely based on expressions of the self (opposite:\nrepresentationalism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fake precision <\/strong>Assumption\nthat measurements expressed with precision must (or must not) represent reality<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fallacy of\ncomposition <\/strong>Assumption that features of the parts of a thing must also be\ntrue of the whole<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fallacy of division <\/strong>Assumption\nthat features of a whole thing must also be true of its parts<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fallacy of the single\ncause <\/strong>Assumption that an event must have (or must not have) a single cause<\/p>\n\n\n\n

False consensus <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the beliefs of the group we participate in must (or must not) be universal<\/p>\n\n\n\n

False dichotomy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the only possible representation of a potential judgement is in terms of\ntwo opposed alternatives<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Falsification of\nhistory <\/strong>Assumption that the past must (or must not) be like the present<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fear of regret <\/strong>Assumption\nthat future regret over an unsuccessful decision must be worse than that over a\nfailure to make a successful one (or vice-versa)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Feature positive\neffect <\/strong>Assumption that positive features in our environment must be more\nimportant than absences (or vice-versa)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Field beliefs <\/strong>Assumption\nthat phenomena must have absolute boundaries (whether in terms of space, time,\nor conceptual relationships) (opposite: that provisional boundaries must be\ninadmissible)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Forecast illusion <\/strong>Assumption\nthat forecasts give us true (or false) beliefs about the future<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Forer Effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat vaguely-phrased descriptions must (or must not) refer to oneself<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Framing <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the words chosen to describe a particular event necessarily justify a\npositive or negative response that could be avoided under a different\ndescription<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Free market <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the mechanisms of the free market will always (or never) have a good\neffect<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freewill <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a rational self can make choices absolutely free of conditioning\n(opposite: determinism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Functionalism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat representations about minds can be completely reduced to a relationship\nbetween external input and output (opposite: cannot be thus reduced \u2013 a form of\nessentialism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fundamental\nattribution error <\/strong>Assumption that other individuals must be totally\nresponsible for negative actions, or not at all responsible for positive\nactions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gambler\u2019s fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat probabilities of future events must necessarily be modified by recent past\nevents, even when these events have causes that are largely independent each\ntime (also see Inappropriate Bayesianism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Genetic fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim must be true or false because of its origins<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geometric progression\nneglect <\/strong>Assumption that series of numbers involving compounded multiplication\nmust progress arithmetically rather than geometrically, with a corresponding\nunder-estimation of the size of the progression<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Groupthink <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the maintenance of immediate harmony in a group must be more important\nthan objective enquiry<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Growth model <\/strong>Assumption\nthat economic improvement must be understood in terms of economic growth\n(opposite: that growth cannot contribute to improvement)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Halo effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a person possessing some attractive features must (or must not) also\npossess others for which there is no immediate evidence<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hasty generalisation <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a general claim must (or must not) be applicable to a whole category when\nit is applicable to a limited number of members of that category <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hedonic treadmill <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the achievement of our desires will (or will not) necessarily make a\ndifference to our long-term happiness<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hedonism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat good must consist in pleasure (opposite: it must not)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hindsight bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat our past actions must have been inevitable and thus that we have no\nresponsibility for them (application of determinism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

House-money effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat valuation is necessarily limited by context (opposite: absolutism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Idealisation <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an experience must (or must not) absolutely justify a claim made about it<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Idealism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat only mental representation (and thus no physical world) must exist\n(opposite: realism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Illusion of attention\n<\/strong>Assumption that we must (or must not) be paying attention to what lies\nwithin our field of sensory apprehension<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Illusion of control <\/strong>Assumption\nthat we must be responsible for effects that correlate with our positive\nactions (opposite: actor\/ observer bias)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Illusion of skill <\/strong>Assumption\nthat good results correlated with skill must (or must not) be caused by that\nskill rather than due to chance<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Illusory correlation <\/strong>Assumption\nthat distinctive or unusual correlations in a temporal succession must (or must\nnot) be causally related<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Impact bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat future traumas must (or must not) override our \u2018immune\u2019 capacity to adjust\nand normalise them<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inability to close\ndoors <\/strong>Assumption that keeping options open must (or must not) be\noverridingly beneficial<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inappropriate\nBayesianism <\/strong>Assumption that probabilities of future events must necessarily\nbe modified by recent past events, even when these events have causes that are\nlargely independent each time (opposite: that the probabilities should not be\nmodified when the causes are not independent)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Incentive super-response\ntendency <\/strong>Assumption that desires stimulated by incentives must (or must\nnot) overrule all other contextual values<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeterminism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat all events must not be sufficiently caused and theoretically predictable\n(opposite: determinism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Information bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat further information will necessarily (or necessarily not) aid the\nobjectivity of judgement<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ingroup bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat member\u2019s of one\u2019s own group must deserve more (or less) favourable\njudgement<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019ll get worse\nbefore it gets better <\/strong>Assumption that present negative events must (or must\nnot) herald better future ones<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introspection\nillusion <\/strong>Assumption that certainty can be gained about the self or about a\npriori truths (whether positively or negatively) through purely \u2018internal\u2019 experience\nof thought<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just world hypothesis\n<\/strong>see Cosmic Justice<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legalism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat rules or laws reflect absolute and inflexible normative truths (opposite:\nantinomianism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Liking bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a liking for someone must (or must not) justify more favourable judgements\nabout them<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Loss aversion <\/strong>Assumption\nthat losses must be unacceptable, regardless of their extent or relationship to\ngains elsewhere (opposite: that they must always be acceptable)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Materialism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat everything in the universe must be composed of physical matter with an\nultimate solidity (opposite: mind-body dualism or idealism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Millenarianism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat ultimate full revelation, together with administration of cosmic justice,\nmust occur at a point in the future (opposite: it must not occur)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mind-body dualism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat both physical and non-physical substance must exist in the universe\n(opposite: monism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Monism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the universe consists in only one type of substance (opposite: mind-body\ndualism, not<\/em> dualism in wider sense\ngiven above)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moral absolutism <\/strong>see\nabsolutism (moral)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moral luck <\/strong>Assumption\nthat people must be (or must not be) entirely responsible for the outcome of\ntheir actions, regardless of the degree of chance involved<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moral naturalism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat certain privileged facts must (or must not) be equivalent to correct\nvalues, regardless of the general interdependence of facts and values<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Motivation crowding <\/strong>Assumption\nthat additional extrinsic motivators will (or will not) necessarily add to\npeople\u2019s motivation, rather than conflicting or detracting from it<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Naturalistic Fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the appeal to certain facts must (or must not) tell us what is universally\nvaluable<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neglect of judgement <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a possible person we encounter must be immediately classified as a person\nor not, regardless of their incremental qualities<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Necessary\/ sufficient\ncause confusion <\/strong>Assumption that a cause that is necessary must (or must\nnot) also be sufficient<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neomania <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a new thing (or person, or concept) must (or must not) be good or true\nbecause of its newness<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neglect of\nprobability <\/strong>Assumption that absolute judgements rather than probabilities\nprovide an adequate response to a particular judgement situation (assumed by\nall metaphysical beliefs, so no opposite)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

News illusion <\/strong>Assumption\nthat news must always (or must not ever) be helpfully informative to us (a form\nof information bias)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nirvana fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an imperfect solution to a problem must be unacceptable merely because of\nits imperfection (assumed by all metaphysical beliefs, so no opposite)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-epistemological\ndiscounting <\/strong>Assumption that future outcomes must (or must not) be less\nvaluable than immediate ones for reasons other than their greater degree of\nuncertainty<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Omission bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat omission of a positive act must (or must not) be less blameworthy than\nnegative action, even when they have similar effects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One-sidedness <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an argument must be adequate when it offers evidence only from a\nrestricted sphere, due to conceptual rather than experiential limitations\n(assumption made by all metaphysical beliefs, so no opposite)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Optimism <\/strong>Assumption\nof inevitable good events in the future (opposite: pessimism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Original language\nfallacy <\/strong>Assumption that texts read in their original language of\ncomposition must (or must not) be more true or beneficial than translated texts<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Outcome bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the causes of past events must (or must not) have been necessary and\nsufficient, regardless of uncertainty at the time<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overconfidence effect<\/strong>\nAssumption that our judgement must (or must not) be correct, applied as a\ndistortion of our estimations of confidence in being correct<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paradox of choice <\/strong>Assumption\nthat more choice is always (or never) good, despite the fact that we are often\nunable to engage with too wide a choice<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Passive aggression<\/strong>\nAssumption that the self is bad and should be an object of aggression<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perfect information <\/strong>Assumption\nmade in economics that people are able to buy and sell in a free market with\nperfect knowledge of that market<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Personification <\/strong>Assumption\nthat those we encounter as individuals must (or must not) be more important\nthan those we do not encounter <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pessimism <\/strong>Assumption\nof inevitable bad events in the future (opposite: optimism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Physicalism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat all phenomena (including minds) are reducible to observable objects\ngoverned by laws of nature (opposite: idealism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Planning fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat costs and completion times for a project must (or must not) be as they\nhave been over-optimistically envisaged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Primacy Effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat our first impressions of an object should always (or never) guide us more\nthan others<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Procrastination <\/strong>Assumption\nthat present desires are always (or never) more important than future goals<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Projection <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an object of experience must (or must not) have the features of a\nparticular concept<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Range neglect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a mean figure reflects (or does not reflect) a truth about things\nrepresented by that figure, regardless of the range of the data drawn on to\ncreate the mean<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rationalism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a priori<\/em> claims arrived at\nthrough reason alone must be true, and that claims supported by the senses lack\nthis certainty (opposite: empiricism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Realism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat real objects must exist in an ultimate or essential sense (opposite:\nidealism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recency Effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat our most recent impressions of an object should always (or never) guide us\nmore than others<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Redefinition Fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat we can absolutely justify (or absolutely not justify) a claim by\nredefining its terms<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reductionism<\/strong> Assumption\nthat the qualities at higher or more complex levels of description can be\nentirely reduced to \u2018true\u2019 descriptions at lower levels (opposite:\nessentialism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regression fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat events must (or must not) have particular identifiable causes that are\nentirely distinct from the events that would have normally occurred without\nthose causes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Relativism (Moral) <\/strong>Assumption\nthat incompatible values can be equally well justified in different contexts\n(opposite: absolutism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Representationalism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the meaning of language must be purely cognitive and derived from the way\nit represents the world (opposite: expressivism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Revelation <\/strong>Assumption\nthat finite humans must be able to gain certainty from communications of an\ninfinite and perfect God (opposite: that any such claimed communications are\nabsolutely known to be false)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scarcity error <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the value must (or must not) increase for us in proportion to its scarcity<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scientific naturalism\n<\/strong>Assumption that all phenomena must be understood in the factual terms of\nscientific description, and excluding values (largely equivalent to\nphysicalism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Self-selection bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a self-selected sample must (or must not) be representative of a wider\ncategory of objects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Self-serving bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat claims that serve an idea of oneself must (or must not) be correct and\nthose that detract from it must (or must not) be incorrect<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social comparison\nbias <\/strong>Assumption that judgements about our own worth must (or must not) be\nmade by comparison with others<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social loafing <\/strong>Assumption\nthat we need take no responsibility for a shared enterprise into which the\nextent of our contribution is vague (opposite: that we must take total\nresponsibility)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social proof <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the claims of our group must be correct (opposite: that they must be\nincorrect)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Soft agnosticism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat certainty might be justified about metaphysical claims (especially the\nexistence of God) in the future, regardless of our continuing finite capacities\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sleeper effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat attempts at persuasion (e.g. advertising) must (or must not) have been\nunsuccessful when they are consciously rejected<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Slippery slope\n(causal) <\/strong>Assumption that an action that may cause one negative effect will\nnecessarily (or necessarily not) cause further negative effects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Slippery slope\n(semantic) <\/strong>Assumption that when boundaries are vague a slippage from better\nto worse interpretations will necessarily (or necessarily not) occur<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Special pleading <\/strong>see\ncasuistry<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Speciesism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat non-human animals must (or must not) have zero responsibility or moral status<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Splitting <\/strong>Assumption\nof an absolute division between accepted and repressed objects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Status quo bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat present arrangements or objects must be preferable to possible new ones,\nregardless of the potential advantages of change (opposite: neomania)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stereotyping <\/strong>Assumption\nthat certain features must (or must not) apply to certain categories of people<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Story bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a person\u2019s character must (or must not) fit an unintegrated archetypal\nprojection, regardless of the selectivity of our information about them<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Straw man <\/strong>Assumption\nof the truth of an account of another person\u2019s belief that would be in conflict\nwith theirs, for the purposes of dismissing their claims (opposite: assumption\nof the falsehood of such an account)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subjective validation\n<\/strong>Assumption that two phenomena must (or must not) be related only because\nour prior assumed theory assumes them to be so <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sunk cost fallacy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat goals must (or must not) be made more valuable by the sacrifices we have already\nmade in pursuing them<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Survivorship bias <\/strong>Assumption\nthat the survivors of a competitive process must (or must not) be\nrepresentative of those who initially engaged in it<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sweeping\ngeneralisation <\/strong>Assumption of the truth (or falsehood) of a general claim\nabout a category based only on observation of a limited number of examples in\nthat category<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sympathetic magic <\/strong>Assumption\nthat similarity or contagion between objects, without any other indicators,\nmust (or must not) produce causal effects<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Texas sharpshooter\nfallacy <\/strong>Assumption that evidence of desirable outcomes must (or must not)\nbe found in phenomena that may be random, with the criteria retrospectively\ndefined <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Theism <\/strong>Assumption\nthat God or gods must exist (opposite: atheism)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Total responsibility\nfallacy <\/strong>Assumption that we must be totally responsible for our judgements\n(opposite: zero responsibility fallacy)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tu quoque <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim made by a person whose actions are inconsistent with that claim\nmust be false<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twaddle tendency <\/strong>Assumption\nthat vague or excessive language must (or must not) be authoritative<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimate attribution\nerror <\/strong>Assumption that other groups and their members must be totally\nresponsible for negative actions, or not at all responsible for positive actions<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Weak analogy <\/strong>Assumption\nthat an analogy provides absolute (or absolutely no) information about the\nobject of comparison<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Winner\u2019s curse <\/strong>Assumption\nof the absolute worth of a prize that has been won against competition, turned\ninto absolute lack of worth when it is recognised that its value is only\nincremental<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wishful thinking <\/strong>Assumption\nthat a claim must be true (or false) because we wish it to be so<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zeigarnik Effect <\/strong>Assumption\nthat uncompleted tasks must (or must not) be remembered but not completed ones<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zero responsibility\nfallacy <\/strong>Assumption that we must have absolutely no responsibility for our\njudgements (opposite: total responsibility fallacy)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"This glossary includes terms for cognitive biases, fallacies and metaphysical beliefs that are used in this book, but that are not terms specific to Middle Way Philosophy because they are also more widely used in psychology and philosophy. My definitions of them may nevertheless offer an unconventional emphasis for practical purposes. A few terms here […]","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":382,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_oct_exclude_from_cache":false,"footnotes":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/553"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=553"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/553\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":554,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/553\/revisions\/554"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/382"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.robertmellis.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}